In trials witnesses often gain by slanting their testimony. The law tries to elicit the truth from witnesses by cross-examination under threat of criminal prosecution for perjury. As a truth-revealing mechanism, perjury law is crude and ineffective. We develop the mathematical form of a perfect truth-revealing mechanism, which exactly offsets the gain from slanted testimony by the risk of a possible sanction. Implementing an effective truth-revealing mechanism requires a witness to certify accuracy by posting bond. If events subsequently prove that the testimony was inaccurate, the witness forfeits the bond. By providing superior incentives for telling the truth, truth-bonding could combat some distortions by factual witnesses and interested experts, including "junk science".
In trials witnesses often gain by slanting their testimony. The law tries to elicit the truth from witnesses by cross-examination under threat of criminal prosecution for perjury. As a truth-revealing mechanism, perjury law is crude and ineffective. We develop the mathematical form of a perfect truth-revealing mechanism, which exactly offsets the gain from slanted testimony by the risk of a possible sanction. Implementing an effective truth-revealing mechanism requires a witness to certify accuracy by posting bond. If events subsequently prove that the testimony was inaccurate, the witness forfeits the bond. By providing superior incentives for telling the truth, truth-bonding could combat some distortions by factual witnesses and interested experts, including "junk science".
In Example 1, the decision of the court does not affect the material interests of the pedestrian who witnessed the accident, so the witness is neutral. In Example 2, the employee who testifies about his boss has an indirect material interest in the case, whereas in Example 3 the mother testifying about her child's paternity has a direct material interest in the case. In Examples 4 and 5, an expert witness increases his prospects for employment in subsequent legal cases by advancing the interests of the person retaining or appointing him.
Overwhelming evidence indicates that slanted testimony is endemic in courts. A classic study by lie detector experts concluded that more that 93% of 600 persons who testified under oath about sex in paternity suites had lied. 1 If a party testifies on his own behalf in a legal dispute, a judgment against him often implies that the court did not believe his testimony. In many trials, factual witnesses give opposite testimony, so one of them is lying. In U.S. trials, expert witnesses often reach opposite conclusions from the same facts. Although difficult to document quantitatively, anyone who participates in U.S. trials knows that expert witnesses can slant testimony without fear of sanctions and some experts provide eccentric criticism that independent scholars describe as "junk science." These facts indicate that existing legal mechanisms fail to deter slanted testimony by witnesses in court. 1 "For 16 years a number of judges of the Chicago Municipal Court have consistently availed themselves of the lie-detector technique to assist them in their decisions...On the basis of a six-year study of the 312 disputed paternity cases at the Chicago laboratory of John E. Reid and Associates, it was determined that 93 percent of the tested parties lied in some respect when they testified in court as to their sexual relationship! The lying ranged from the defendant's complete denial of any intercourse with the complainant, when he actually did have it with her during the conception period, to the complainant
The main formal mechanism for deterring slanted testimony is the threat of criminal prosecution for perjury. In recent decades economists have formulated mathematical mechanisms that provide incentives for telling the truth. In this paper, we describe the optimal mechanism to induce witnesses to tell the truth. Comparing the optimal mechanism to perjury law explains why it fails to deter slanted testimony and suggests how to reform the law. We propose an innovative legal institution called "truth-bonding," which requires the witness to forfeit a bond if subsequent facts prove that his testimony was inaccurate. Truth-bonding can potentially improve the quality of testimony by the plaintiff, defendant, experts, and other interested witnesses. In this paper we will critique perjury rules as a truth-revealing mechanism, describe the optimal mechanism, and discuss its implementation through truth-bonds.
A. Perjury and Other Legal Incentives for Truthfulness
To prevent slanted testimony, courts probe the quality of a witness's testimony on cross-examination, searching for internal inconsistencies or contradictions with testimony by other witnesses. Poor performance under cross-examination can damage the witness's reputation, especially when the judge chastises the witness. Loss of reputation informally deters slanted testimony.
Instead of focusing on informal deterrents, however, we analyze private suits for false testimony and criminal prosecutions for perjury. Private suits for false testimony are forbidden in many countries and rare in all countries known to us. The same words simply exaggerating the number of times intercourse did take place with the defendant during the that constitute slander or libel when spoken or written outside the courtroom are "strictly privileged" when spoken inside an American courtroom. "Strict privilege"
means that false testimony cannot support a civil suit for damages, even for outrageous and damaging lies. 2 In the US, a witness is immune from civil liability arising from false testimony at trial, so a victim of slander or libel in court has no private legal remedy. This proposition is so unchallenged that prominent torts professors have difficulty citing the authority for it. 3 In common law countries outside the U.S., court testimony is mostly privileged against a civil suit, 4 but strict privilege is not universal. 5 In some civil law countries, false testimony sometimes causes civil liability. To illustrate, § 826 German Civil Code (BGB) states that the victim can recover damages where the injurer violated "good morals" with "intent to harm." Judges responding to this decision have developed case law on civil liability for false witnessing in court. The rules made by the judges, however, are so restrictive that they approximate "strict privilege" as found in common law. To illustrate, the constitutional court ruled that parties should never be liable for statements made in court as long as they themselves perceive their statements to be conception period." (Arthur and Reid 1954) at page 215. Also see (Zimring 1999 ). 2 If the false witness is the criminal, however, restitution statutes may give the court the occasion to compensate the victim for the total consequences of the crime. 3 (Keeton et al. 1984 ) at page 872 supports this proposition, citing (Note 1977 357-58 (1973) . (Tiersma 1990 ) argues against the "literal truth" defense of Bronston and in favor of a conception of truth based ona "speech-acts" theory. Also see (Nagel 1998 (Nagel or 1999 and (Tiersma 1990 ). 11 (Suro and Miller 1998) ; (Cooper 1999) . 12 (Suro and Miller 1998 In a criminal trial for perjury, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant lied. If the law allows civil liability for false testimony, then the plaintiff in a civil case must prove the relevant form of fault by the defendant. In either case, the heavy burden of proof precludes bringing prosecutions with sufficient frequency to deter slanted When a criminal defendant denies the charges on the witness stand and is nonetheless convicted, we do not expect the prosecutor to bring a new perjury. When witnesses under oath say they cannot remember events, this convenient amnesia is discounted by judges and juries, and few will face perjury charges." 16 (Rappaport 1993; Reuben 1983 ). 17 If a trial were scheduled for a day that a policeman was off duty, an police who was on duty would lie in court by saying that he witnessed the events actually witnessed by the off-duty policeman. In some cases, however, "testilying" was also used to cover-up police crimes. See (Kocieniewski 1997; Sexton 1994) . Also see (Chin and Wells 1998; Dripps 1996; McClurg 1999; Slobogin 1996) . 18 (Marcus 1998 ).
testimony. As explained in the next section, a better truth-revealing mechanism lowers the burden of proof by replacing a legal standard of fault with a rule of strict liability for mistaken testimony.
B. Perfect Truth-Revealing Mechanism
In 1954 Paul Samuelson provided the first formal definition of a "public good." 19 Economists immediately recognized that financing public goods by a tax on the beneficiaries involves a problem of "preference revelation." Twenty years later, economists generalized this problem to "truth revelation" and they sought to discover incentives for truth-telling that no strategy could defeat. 20 A few scholars have applied such mechanisms to problems in law, 21 but not to witnesses in courts. The role of the expert witness in court has been discussed outside this framework. 22 We begin to apply this framework to courts by describing the assumptions of our model. We assume that a witness observes a fact that is relatively good or relatively bad for him. The witness is either certain or uncertain about the observation's accuracy. In more technical language, a witness receives a signal that is better or worse with high or low precision. When testifying in court, a witness reports on the signal's content (better/worse) and precision (high/low). As indicated in Table 1 , an honest witness reports truthfully about content and a dishonest witness reports falsely about content. (Samuelson 1954; Samuelson 1955 ). 20 For a review of mechanism design literatures, see (Emons 1994) . Also see (Farrell and Rabin 1996) . 21 (Hoffman and Spitzer 1985) ; (Emons and Sobel 1991) ; cite Spier **; (Sanchirico 1996 Table 2 , a candid witness reports accurately about precision and a misleading witness reports inaccurately about precision. We use the term "slanted" to mean dishonest or misleading, and we use "truthful" to mean honest and candid. A "truth-revealing mechanism" elicits truthful testimony.
After a witness testifies, subsequent events during or after the trial may prove that the testimony was right or wrong. To illustrate by Example 1, after the pedestrian testifies that the stoplight was red, someone may discover a photograph proving conclusively that the stoplight was green. In Example 2, the employee may testify that the boss was not at the cartel's secret meeting, and, as the case develops, the boss may admit that he was at the meeting. In Example 3, the mother may testify that the rich man is the child's father and, after the trial, subsequent developments in biology may prove that she was right.
Our model stylizes these facts. We assume that a signal, which is characterized by content and precision, is transmitted to the witness. The witness testifies about the signal before a court or similar body. Subsequently the court receives a signal tending to confirm or disconfirm the witness's testimony. If the court's signal disconfirms the witness's testimony, then the truth-revealing mechanism imposes a sanction. Figure 1 depicts the order of events. In discussing the model, we will simplify by assuming that the court discovers with positive probability whether the content of the testimony was right or wrong. If the testimony was wrong, then the mechanism imposes a sanction. Unlike content, the court gets no independent information about the precision of the signal observed by the witness.
By definition, a perfect truth-revealing mechanism induces honest and candid testimony in all circumstances. The mathematical form of such a mechanism, which we derive formally elsewhere, has an intuitive interpretation. 23 In some circumstances, an interested witness gains from slanted testimony. Against this gain, the witness must balance the probability and magnitude of a sanction. An expected sanction greater or equal to the gain from slanted testimony provides sufficient incentive to tell the truth.
The expected sanction equals the probability times the magnitude of the sanction. The sanction's probability equals the probability that the evidence obtained after the witness's testimony disconfirms it. The sanction's magnitude for disconfirmed testimony depends on the testimony's precision. The court assesses a higher sanction for inaccurate testimony that the witness offered with certainty rather than uncertainty.
To illustrate, consider the mother in Example 3. Assume that she believes that the poor man is the father. She will, however, enjoy a larger court award by asserting falsely that she believes that the rich man is the father. Furthermore, her expected award from a false assertion is larger if she makes it with certainty rather than uncertainty.
Perhaps officials will eventually discover the truth through advances in biology. Such a discovery could trigger a sanction. By definition, the expected sanction equals the probability that such events will trigger a sanction multiplied by the sanction's magnitude. With minimum sanctions necessary to induce honest and candid testimony, the expected sanction exactly equals the mother's gain from a false or misleading report.
In so far as the mother's gain from a false report is higher when she asserts that she is certain rather than uncertain, the perfect sanction must be higher when her dishonest testimony is given with certainty rather than uncertainty.
As another illustration, consider the medical expert in Example 5. Assume that her tests indicate that the drug is not defective, but she is uncertain about these tests. By assumption, the judge who retains her prefers to end the trial quickly. To promote her future business, the expert can please the judge by testifying falsely that she is certain that the drug is not defective. By doing so, however, the expert runs the risk that someone will subsequently present irrefutable proof that the drug is defective. When applying the perfect truth-revealing mechanism to this case, the expected sanction increases when the expert who is uncertain asserts that she is certain, and the increase exactly equals the gain to the expert from more business in the future.
Some testimony, such as an expert opinion, is almost impossible to disconfirm.
To illustrate, the concept of "market share" in Example 4 is too low for decisive determination. Thus an economist who asserted, say, that the defendant's market share did not exceed 20%, could defend this opinion by quibbling about the definition of "market share." The possibility of sanctioning the economist for inaccurate testimony requires eliciting sufficiently precise testimony to judge its accuracy. To make disconfirmation possible, the attorney cross-examining the economist in Example 4 might ask him to testify that his opinions are not eccentric or bizarre relative to other economists. For example, the economist might have to testify that at least 50% of disinterested industrial economists at major universities, when confronted with the same evidence that he relied upon, would conclude that the defendant's market share did not exceed 20%.
In Table 3 we use numbers to illustrate the perfect truth-revealing mechanism.
The first row of numbers indicates the witness's gain from testifying "better" rather than worse," and also he gains from testifying that his certainty is "high" rather than "low".
As indicated by Table 3 , the minimum expected sanction that induces honest and candid testimony at least offsets the gains from slanted testimony, so all false testimony earns the same or lower net payoff than the truth. Furthermore, the sanction is zero when the witness provides the least advantageous testimony relative to his own interest, as required to elicit the truth with minimum sanctions. In Table 3 , honest and candid testimony "weakly dominates" the alternatives. (By an appropriate increase in the schedule of sanctions, "weak dominance" becomes "strong dominance.") According to Table 3 , the witness expects to gain at least as much from testifying truthfully as from not testifying. Specifically, the witness expects to gain 5 from testifying truthfully and 0 from not testifying. Consequently, the witnesses will testify voluntarily and truthfully. In general, the perfect truth-revealing mechanism is individually rational in the sense that witnesses will testify voluntarily. The perfect truth-revealing mechanism does not "chill" testimony in the sense of discouraging witnesses who would otherwise testify.
One implication of individual rationality is the optimal sanction for a neutral witness who makes a mistake is nil. In other words, the optimal mechanism imposes a sanction of zero for wrong testimony by a witness who gains nothing from testifying.
Otherwise, neutral witnesses who are self-interested would not testify voluntarily.
To understand better the construction of Table 3 , consider the probabilities underlying the expected sanction. Assume the witness observes the signal "worse & low." Further assume that the court will subsequently observe "worse" with probability 2/3 and "better" with probability 1/3. According to the first row of numbers in Table 4 , the probability that honest testimony ("worse") will appear wrong and trigger a sanction equals 1/3, whereas the probability that dishonest testimony ("better") will appear wrong and trigger a sanction equals 2/3. According to the third row of numbers in Table 4 , the sanction increases from 0 to 18 for changing the precision of an honest report from low to high. Similarly, the sanction increases from 3 to 33 for changing the precision of a dishonest report from low to high. The expected sanctions in the third row of Table 4 , which equal the probability of a sanction multiplied by the sanction's severity, correspond to the expected sanctions in the second row of Table 3 . For our simple truth-revealing mechanism to exist, the payoff must (weakly) increase when the report changes from "worse" to "better" or from "low" to "high." We call this condition "monotonicity." Notice that we can switch labels between the columns "worse & high" and "better & low" in Table 3 and 4 without violating monotonicity. In general, transposing the payoffs for "worse&high" and "better&low"
does not affect the existence of a perfect truth-revealing mechanism.
C. Contrasting Perjury and Truth-Revealing

Mechanisms
Perjury contrasts with the perfect truth-revealing mechanism in several respects.
First, with the perfect truth-revealing mechanism, facts coming to light that contradict the testimony triggers the sanction. Inaccuracy, however, is only one criterion for perjury. In addition, the prosecution in a perjury case must prove that inaccuracy was intentional. This proof involves difficult probabilistic inferences that we analyze elsewhere. 24 Given the difficulty of proving intent, only an extreme sanction for perjury will deter it.
Second, the optimal mechanism conforms to the familiar principle that deterrence requires punishment to increase in proportion to the gain from wrongdoing and the probability that the wrongdoer will escape punishment. 25 We define a simple perjury rule as imposing an invariant sanction relative to the probability of its application and the gain from wrongdoing. Conversely, we define a sophisticated perjury rule as imposing a sanction that varies with the probability of its application and the gain from wrongdoing. Actual perjury rules resemble simple rules more than sophisticated rules. . 25 An exposition of this familiar argument from law and economics is in Chapter 11 of (Cooter and Ulen 1999). 26 (Kislak and Donoghue 1999) at pages 980-981 and (Fitzpatrick and Torraco 1999) at pages 624-626 discuss various enhancements to perjury sentences under federal guidelines. None of the enhancements include the probability that the crime will go unpunished. In fact, few wrongs are sanctioned according to the requirements of the rule of the reciprocal. Thus (Craswell 1999 ) at page 2188 writes:
Because of these limitations summarized in Table 5 , a perjury rule is an imperfect truth-revealing mechanism, even when supplemented by a private suit for false witness. If reporting truthfully advances the interests of the witness, he can overstate his confidence in his report without fear of prosecution. If reporting falsely advances the interests of the witness, he can report falsely and reduce the probability of prosecution by saying that that he is uncertain about the facts. In either case, an interested witness has an incentive to distort testimony to obtain a better result at trial. Even an honest, candid witness runs a very small risk of being sanctioned for perjury due to a court error. Since a court is more likely to find perjury when testimony was given with certainty rather than uncertainty, a neutral witness who is honest minimizes Significantly, few legal regimes follow the traditional multiplier in this respect, for few (if any) use multipliers that are calculated case-by-case. Often no multiplier is used and only compensatory damages are awarded, as in most civil suits under the common law. When the law does use a multiplier, it is often set at a single value that is the same for all defendants, as in the treble damage rule of antitrust law. And when criminal or administrative penalties are used, it is common to set a single fine for all violations of a certain type (e.g., $100 for failing to stop at a stop sign), regardless of either the harm caused or the probability of punishment. Obviously, none of these systems of punishment satisfies the traditional, case-by-case multiplier principle. Also see (Polinsky and Shavell 1998) . In England the judge can issue a restitution order after a criminal conviction for perjury, and US judges also have some scope to do the same. Restitution has the advantage that the sanction increases with the injurer's gain, as required by a "sophisticated rule," but the problem remains that the sanction does not increase with the probability that the wrong will go unpunished. the probability of being sanctioned for perjury by understating his certainty. To illustrate, consider Example 1 in which a neutral pedestrian believes that she saw a green light when two motorists collided. The pedestrian knows that witnesses and courts make mistakes. The probability of being sanctioned for perjury is lower if she testifies that she is uncertain rather than certain. In general, enforcement of a perjury rule provides an incentive for a neutral witness to understate the precision of the signal received. 27 The incentive for neutral witnesses to understate their certainty diminishes with the frequency of perjury prosecutions. In practice the probability of prosecuting a neutral witness for perjury is close to zero. (We could not find any such cases.) In this respect, the actual law of perjury approximates the perfect truth-revealing mechanism.
The reason usually given for prosecuting perjury so seldom is the fear of chilling witnesses. 28 As our analysis demonstrates, this fear is real for neutral witnesses who have nothing to gain from testifying. Assuming self-interested rationality, a neutral witness would prefer not to testify rather than face a small possibility of mistaken prosecution for perjury. If compelled to testify, such a witness would minimize the 27 An interested witness voluntarily undertakes this risk for personal gain. Why does a disinterested witness undertake this risk? Possibly a disinterested witness feels compelled to testify by law, social pressure, or a sense of civil responsibility. 28 "…the necessities of a free trial demand that witnesses are not to be deterred by fear of tort suits, and shall be immune from liability." Quotation from (Note 1977) , cited favorably by (Keeton et al. 1984 ) at page 872. (Suro and Miller 1998) offers this rationale: "'It is so common for honest witnesses to remember events differently or to get confused or make mistakes that you need a law that only punishes lies that are deliberate and have real consequences," said Ephraim Margolin, a criminal defense lawyer in San Francisco. "Otherwise, every witness would be exposed to prosecution.'..."For centuries, AngloAmerican courts have erected stiff hurdles against perjury prosecutions in part so that witnesses will not fear that a misstatement would expose them to prosecution." chances of prosecution for perjury by understating his certainty. The situation, however, is different for interested witnesses. The fear of chilling witnesses with much to gain from testifying is misplaced. Under the perfect truth-revealing mechanism, the expected sanction never exceeds the advantage gained by the witness from testifying. This is the requirement of "individual rationality" imposed on the design of the perfect truthrevealing mechanism. The perfect truth-revealing mechanism never deters a witness from giving testimony.
These facts suggest extending our analysis and reformulating the problem of chilling witnesses as a tradeoff. In some circumstances, a witness will benefit himself by slanting testimony and harm himself by truthful testimony. In these circumstances, his first preference is to slant his testimony, his second preference is not to testify, and his third preference is to testify truthfully. Under a perjury rule, such a witness will voluntarily provide slanted testimony. Under a perfect truth-revealing mechanism, such a witness will not testify voluntarily. If the law compels the witness to testify under a perfect truth-revealing mechanism, the court will hear testimony against the interests of the witness. When the law cannot compel a witness to testify, as is often the case, a tradeoff occurs between the quantity and quality of testimony. If the court employs a truth revealing mechanism, some witness will not testify and those who do will tell the truth. If the court only employs a perjury rule, more witnesses testify and more of them will slant their testimony. We plan to analyze this tradeoff in a subsequent paper.
D. Truth-Bonding
The perfect truth-revealing mechanism can be implemented in a variety of ways.
The obvious implementation requires the judge to impose the optimal sanction whenever events disprove the witness's testimony. The obvious implementation, however, ignores the limits on the court's information. A better implementation interprets the optimal sanction as a bond posted by the witness and forfeited in the event that evidence disconfirms his testimony. The amount of bond is negotiated between the parties. A market bond is a better interpretation of the optimal mechanism than a court sanction because bonding requires the court to have less information than sanctioning.
This paper, however, does not analyze the market for truth bonds. In a future paper we
hope to analyze thoroughly the intuitions that we now sketch.
We use the example in Tables 3 and 4 for optimal bond, which, according to Table 4 , equals 3 for the false report of "better & low." (Later we explain why the two sides might prefer the optimal bond.). After the witness posts bond, the court might subsequently learn that the testimony was wrong, which, according to Table 3 , happens with probability 2/3. In this example, the witness foresees that testifying "better & low" falsely will cause him to post bond of 3 and lose it with probability 2/3, yielding an expected loss of 2.
The expected loss of 2, according to Table 3 , exactly offsets the increase in his payoff from slanting testimony. So the witness expects to do just as well by testifying truthfully as by slanting testimony. Foreseeing these facts, the witness truthfully reports "worse & low." According to Table 4 , the other side does not request bond when the witness reports "worse & low." This example illustrates a typical outcome of truth bonding: The threat that the opposing side will ask for bond evokes the truth without the posting of bond.
The optimal bond for truthful testimony, however, can be positive rather than zero. Regardless of whether the optimal bond for truthful testimony is zero or positive, a threat prevents the witness from slanting testimony. The threat is that slanting testimony will cause the other side to request a change in the bond that increases its expected payoff. Increasing the expected payoff typically requires increasing the bond.
Consequently, the threat that the other side will ask for more bond typically evokes the truth.
We have explained how optimal bonding makes the witness tell the truth. Now we explain why the opposing side might ask the witness to post optimal bond, rather than asking for more or less bond. We assume that the party asking for bond must pay a statistically fair price, by which we mean that the bond's price equals its expected payoff. To illustrate, if the bond pays x with probability p, then the statistically fair price equals px. The party who pays a statistically fair price for bond expects to break even, regardless of the bond's size.
Who gets the price of the bond? Not the witness. The witness cannot receive the price of the bond because this would destroy the incentives to tell the truth. The truth-revealing mechanism requires a change in the size of the bond to offset the increase in the witness's payoff from slanting testimony. If the statistically fair price were paid to the witness, he would be equally well off regardless of the bond's size, so a change in the bond's size could not offset the higher payoff from slanting testimony. In negotiating bond, the parties should agree that the price will be paid to a third party such as the court. 29 Now we explain why the opposing side in our example should ask the witness who testifies "better & low" to post the optimal bond. If the opposing side requests bond that is less than the optimum, the witness can gain from slanting testimony in a direction that harms the opposing side. The opposing side, consequently, will not ask for bond that is less than the optimum.
The trick is explaining why the opposing side does not ask for more than the optimum. By asking for more than the optimum, the opposing side can elicit the truth, or possibility cause the witness to slant testimony in a direction favoring opposing side.
One possibility is that the opposing side wants to elicit the truth from the witness without imposing an unnecessary burden. This possibility is simple and straightforward but not very convincing.
Another possibility, which is more convincing and unexplored formally, concerns credibility. In a market the witness is free to reject the opposing side's request for bond. Rejecting bond, however, affects the credibility of the witness's testimony.
We assume that rejected requests for bond get reported to the court. We also assume that the court distinguishes between reasonable and unreasonable requests for bond. If the witness rejects a reasonable request for bond, the court heavily discounts the witness's testimony. To maintain credibility, the witness cannot reject a reasonable request for bond. Conversely, if the witness rejects an unreasonable request for bond, the court does not discount the witness's testimony. Rejecting unreasonable requests for bond does not undermine the witness's credibility. Given these assumptions, the opposing side will only request reasonable bond. In so far as reasonable bond is optimal, the opposing side will request optimal bond. To illustrate by our example, if the court believes that 3 is reasonable bond and more than 3 is unreasonable, then the opposing side will ask the witness to post bond of 3.
We have described a market for truth bonds whose success depends on the ability of the court to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable requests for bond. How does the court obtain the necessary information? If the parties disagree over the threat is not credible that the other side will request optimal bond and pay it to the court. Avoiding the reasonableness of a request for bond, they could argue the facts to the court in an attempt to influence the court's opinion. Ideally a truth-revealing mechanism should be implemented so that the parties provide truthful testimony as this stage in the trial.
To illustrate how these processes might operate in court proceeding, we will modify our example. Before we assumed that the witness observes "worse & low."
Now assume that that the witness observes "better & low." Otherwise the example is unchanged. We make this change in assumptions so that the optimal bond for truthful testimony as given by Table 4 is positive rather than zero. When testifying, the witness anticipates correctly that he will be requested to post the optimal bond, so he tells the truth and report "better & low." The other side, who suspects that the witness observed "worse & low," requests a pause in the trial to negotiate bond. In negotiations the witness initially offers to post bond of 2 and the other side demands bond of 4. After discussing the facts, both sides recognize that the optimal bond for testifying "better & low" equals 3, and the statistically fair price equals 1. Both sides recognize that a hearing before the court would convince it that 3 is reasonable bond and 1 is a fair price.
Consequently, both sides agree that the witness will post bond of 3 and the other side will pay a price of 1 to the court. The parties present the court with this contract. If the court subsequently learns that the testimony was wrong, the witness will pay 3 to the other side.
this credibility problem requires revising the truth-revealing mechanism that this paper relies on. We hope to analyze these possible markets in another paper. For now we note that implementing truth bonding would require two changes in legal procedure. First, courts must enforce truth-bonding contracts between a witness and the opposing side.
Second, courts must admit as evidence the rejection by the witness of a request for bond.
E. The Mechanism's Limits
Here we mention some of our mechanism's limits. Our mechanism prevents the witness from slanting his testimony, but our mechanism does not prevent the witness from withholding testimony. If a witness stands to lose by testifying on a particular question and the opposing side asks the right question, our mechanism causes the witness to tell the truth. If, however, the other side does not know what question to ask, our mechanism will not cause the witness to reveal the relevant facts. To extend truthrevelation to omitted evidence, the witness would have to bond the proposition that he did not omit any materially relevant facts.
A party to a dispute who stands to gain from another's false testimony might offer to pay any sanction imposed on the witness. Such side payments increase the sanction required for perfect truth-revelation and also complicate the task of estimating the optimal sanction. If these problems prove severe, criminal law has a solution.
Suborning a witness to commit perjury is a crime. Perhaps a party who pays the sanction of a witness should be regarded as suborning perjury.
In our model, discovery of facts triggering the sanction is exogenous. Thus in Figure 1 , the confirming or disconfirming evidence simply appears at some point after the witness testifies. In reality, the trigger may be endogenous to the trial. Thus, for example, when two witnesses testify in court, the second witness may provide the information that triggers the bond of the first witness. An endogenous trigger raises strategic problems for our model. For example, with endogenous triggers it is usually better to testify later rather than earlier in the trial. Similarly, if a finding of fact by a judge triggers a bond, the judge might become less willing to find the fact.
Our truth-revealing mechanism suffers a technical failure for some patterns of gains to witnesses. In Examples 3 and 5, the witness's lowest payoff apparently comes from testifying "worse & low", and the highest payoff comes from testifying "better & high." To illustrate, in Example 3 the mother gains most from testifying with certainty that the rich man is the father. Next, she gains from testifying with certainty that the poor man is the father. The worst possibility for her is that she cannot testify with certainty about the father's identity. Thus payoffs increase whenever the witness testifies with higher certainty. With this pattern of gains to witnesses, which we call "monotonicity," our mechanism always works.
In situations like Examples 2 and 4, however, the witness sometimes gains more from reporting uncertainty rather than certainty. To illustrate by Example 2, if the employee must testify against his interests that his boss was at the meeting, then he is better off to be uncertain rather than certain. In Example 4, if the expert must testify against his interests that the alleged monopolist actually had a low market share, the expert benefits from testifying that he is uncertain rather than certain. When a witness loses from testifying with certainty rather than uncertainty, our truth-revealing mechanism suffers a technical failure from the absence of monotonicity. This technical problem, however, has a technical fix. 30 We assume that after the witness testifies, disconfirming or confirming information appears with positive probability, but we do not ask the question, "What level of disconfirming evidence provides the best trigger for the sanction?" The simplest trigger is a finding of fact by the court that contradicts the witness's testimony. To illustrate, the sanction could apply to the employee in Example 2 if the court found that the employee's boss was at the cartel meeting, or the sanction could apply to the mother in Example 3 if the court found biological proof that the poor man is the father.
In some circumstances, however, the simplest trigger may not be best. To illustrate, when a finding of fact involves a difficult judgment by the court, making the witness forfeit bond because the court disbelieved him could create perverse incentives.
Such a rule puts the witness in the position of a judge in Keynes's beauty contest, where each judge on the panel gets a prize for picking the winner. Thus a witness with weak credentials might not want to risk truthful testimony that contradicts another witness with strong credentials. This problem partly involves the level of proof at which the court should conclude that the testimony was inaccurate. If court has to find a fact in a case that would trigger the bond, then the preponderance of the evidence standard might be inappropriate. A complete model would investigate the burden of proof that is best for triggering the sanction. 31 The trigger for the sanction depends on how the testimony is framed. Instead of testifying to facts, experts often offer opinions. When an expert offers an opinion, the sanction is best applied to the level of scientific support for the opinion. To illustrate, the economist in Example 4 offers an expert opinion concerning the defendant's market share. The interrogator should ask a question like, "Given the facts that you relied upon, would at least 50% of randomly chosen, disinterested industrial economists agree with your conclusion about the defendant's market? "How about 50%? Or 30%? At what level will you bond your testimony?" The threat of a sanction for inaccuracy would force the expert to accurately characterize the level of support among scientists for his opinions. 32 By this means, unusual or eccentric opinions are exposed as such. Having 31 A start on analyzing a related problem is found in (Bernardo, Talley, and Welch 1999). 32 Recall Keynes's beauty contest, a judge receives a prize for predicting the contest's winner. Truthbonding of expert opinion situates the party offering bond much like a judge in Keynes's beauty contest admitted that his opinion is unusual or eccentric, the expert is free to argue that he is right and other experts are wrong.
F. Conclusion
In discussing the problem of evaluating the testimony of witnesses in court,
Fisher writes:
We do not leave our jurors wholly unequipped for this task of lie detecting. They come to court, as we so often tell them, with their common sense and may reject any evidence that defies it. Inside court, we give them three more lie-detecting tools: the oath, demeanor evidence, and cross-examination. 33 This "tool box" resembles the emperor's new clothes in Hans Christian Andersen's story. Slanted testimony often leaves courts so perplexed that rules allocating the burden of proof determine outcomes. What the tool box lacks is a truth-revealing mechanism. As far as we can tell, Solomon was the only judge to employ a truthrevealing mechanism, and it is strategically vulnerable. 34 Solving a problem presupposes recognizing it, and scholars of perjury have not recognized the possibility of a truth-revealing mechanism for courts. Scholarship on perjury and lying seems unaware of truth-revealing mechanisms. Some scholars seek to 33 (Fisher 1997 ) at page 578. This paper acknowledges the difficulty of a jury detecting false witness and endorses the rightness of assigning them this task 34 Two women both claimed to be the mother of the same baby. Solomon invited the two women to a tugof-war with the baby's body, then he proclaimed the mother to be the woman who let go first. A mechanism is "strategy proof" if a person who understands it cannot circumvent it. Solomon's mechanism is not strategy proof because the false mother who understood the mechanism refuse to tug on the baby just like the true mother.
unify perjury law by harmonizing differences in statutes and practices. 35 Another topic of scholarly concern is the fairness of prosecuting someone who perjured himself in his own unsuccessful defense against a criminal charge. 36 In addressing this topic, scholars delicately dissect the issues of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. 37 Scholars have also explored the history of perjury law. 38 Another topic, whose reforming spirit resembles our paper without its analytical apparatus, is whether to confine perjury to literal lies or broaden the crime to encompass misleading statements. 39 Sociological studies of lying, which occasionally add interesting observations, lack analysis or theory. 40 In contrast, economists have devoted much effort to developing truth-revealing mechanisms without applying them to courts. 41 This paper applies results from the theory of mechanism design to investigate the smallest sanctions for inaccuracy that make accurate testimony best for a self-interested witness. In brief, we investigate the minimal, perfectly truth-revealing sanctions. The optimal sanction for testimony that proves inaccurate equals or exceeds the gain to the witness from slanted testimony. In principle, the optimal sanction could deter distortions by factual witnesses and exaggerations by experts, including "junk science."
Theorists who imagine that economic incentives are the law's "hidden logic"
will be disappointed to learn that the law of perjury is grossly sub-optimal. Perjury law is fault based, whereas our mechanism involves strict liability for inaccurate testimony.
Furthermore, the optimal mechanism bases sanctions on the gain to the injurer and the probability of escaping the sanction, whereas perjury law is unresponsive to these considerations.
Adjusting legal rules of procedure and liability to provide an optimal truthrevealing mechanism requires legal reform. We discuss implementation through truthbonding. Perhaps modest changes in contract law would enable truth-bonding to develop through negotiations and markets, thus substituting private law for perjury law.
Or perhaps truth-bonding requires a heavily regulated contract market. In spite of many practical obstacles, truth-bonding has the promise of improving the quality of testimony in court. We hope that our framework will enable future research will identify useful ways to implement truth-bonds.
Economists often study the effect of policies on efficiency and distribution. In contrast, this paper investigates the effect of legal process on truthfulness. We implicitly assume that trials achieve better outcomes when witnesses tell the truth. The maxim of our paper is that the best guarantee of truth in court is the relatively costliness of a lie.
